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Abstract
We extend the theoretical framework in Cuæat and Melitz (2007) to a many-country setup
where countries exhibit di⁄erent degrees of labor market ￿ exibility. We rely on the insights from
a recent paper by Costinot (2009) to obtain precise predictions about comparative advantage in
this setting: countries with more ￿ exible labor markets specialize in more volatile industries.
￿We thank (without implicating) Pol Antr￿s for comments and Arnaud Costinot for a very helpful discussion.
Cuæat gratefully acknowledges ￿nancial support from Spain￿ s CICYT (ECO2008-04669).1 Introduction
There is a long tradition in international trade theory of studying issues related to the labor market
and its imperfections. The classic papers by Brecher (1974a, 1974b), the contributions of Matusz
(1996), Saint-Paul (1997), Davis (1998a, 1998b), Br￿gemann (2003) and Davidson et al. (1999),
and the very recent work by Davis and Harrigan (2008), Felbermayr et al. (2008), Helpman and
Itskhoki (2008), and Helpman et al. (2008) exemplify, among others, this long-standing interest in
the workings of open-economy models with di⁄erent types of labor market frictions. Those labor
market frictions are typically characterized by a detailed modeling of the country-level labor market
institutions. On the empirical side, Cuæat and Melitz (2007) show that international di⁄erences in
labor market ￿ exibility do constitute an important source of comparative advantage: evidence for
a large sample of countries con￿rms that the exports of countries with more ￿ exible labor markets
are biased towards high-volatility sectors, as cross-country di⁄erences in labor market regulation
a⁄ect how ￿rms can adjust to idiosyncratic shocks.
In this paper we extend the theoretical framework in Cuæat and Melitz (2007). In comparison
with many of the aforementioned references, we treat labor market institutions in a relatively
coarse way. The trade-o⁄ is that we can analyze the pattern of specialization in a setting with
many goods and countries that exhibit di⁄erent degrees of labor market ￿ exibility. This allows
for a closer integration with the associated empirical work. We rely on the insights from a recent
paper by Costinot (2009) to obtain precise predictions about comparative advantage in a many-
country setting. This allows us to generalize the predictions from the two-country version of our
model developed in Cuæat and Melitz (2007): countries with relatively more ￿ exible labor markets
specialize in relatively more volatile industries.
In general, generating precise predictions for the pattern of comparative advantage in a Ricar-
dian setting with multiple goods and countries has been problematic. The classic contributions by
Deardor⁄ (1980) and Dixit and Norman (1980), based on the duality approach, provide a solution
to the many-good issue, but leave the many-country problem open. Eaton and Kortum (2002) show
how a probabilistic approach to such a Ricardian model can yield precise predictions for trade ￿ ows
and relative prices as well as a tractable computable general equilibrium model of trade; but such a
probabilistic approach sidesteps the determination of the pattern of specialization across countries
and sectors (based on technology di⁄erences across countries). Costinot (2009) develops a general
open-economy framework with many countries, sectors, and factors that can be adapted to many
1more speci￿c cases. The Ricardian version of his model focuses on the case where each country
produces a single good, but he also mentions that this setup can be extended to the case where each
country specializes in a continuum of goods, as initially analyzed by Dornbusch et al (1977) for the
two country case. Once we solve for the e⁄ects of labor market ￿ exibility on industry productivity,
our model becomes a speci￿c example of this extension. We provide a proof for this extension,
which follows a very similar logic to the one originally developed by Costinot (2009). This proof
is not speci￿c to our particular institutional assumptions, and thus applies more generally as a
multi-country extension of Dornbusch et al (1977) with complete specialization. In that equilib-
rium, every country specializes in a non-overlapping range of goods on the continuum, based on
their country-level technology. As in Costinot (2009), the multi-country extension imposes a strong
assumption on the pattern of cross-country di⁄erences in technology. That assumption is based
on a unidimensional ordering of countries and sectors, each along a given characteristic. The key
assumption is then one of log-supermodularity for country-industry TFP as a function of the coun-
try and industry characteristics. Given this, the open economy equilibrium solves an assignment
problem of industries to countries (assigning production in that industry to a given country).
2 The Model
There are many countries, denoted by c. Each country is endowed with Lc units of labor, which
is supplied inelastically and internationally immobile. Preferences are identical across countries.
Agents maximize utility over a large number of ￿nal goods, denoted by i.1 We think of each
industry i as a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of nontraded sectors s:
y (i) = exp
￿Z 1
0
lny (i;s)ds
￿
;
where y (i) denotes production of ￿nal good i. Each good s is produced in turn with a continuum
of nontraded intermediate goods:
y (i;s) =
￿Z 1
0
y (i;s;z)
"￿1
" dz
￿ "
"￿1
: (1)
1We can think of these many goods as a continuum.
2Intermediate goods are produced according to the ￿ Ricardian￿technology
y (i;s;z) = e￿L(i;s;z);
where ￿ is a stochastic term. Within each industry, ￿ is an iid draw from a common distribution
Gi(:), identical across countries, but di⁄erent across industries, with mean 0 and variance ￿2 (i). We
will refer to ￿2 (i) as industry i￿ s ￿ volatility￿ . This formulation emphasizes shocks to intermediate
good producers on the production side; allowing instead for demand shocks in equation (1) would
yield identical results to the ones we discuss below. As a given realization of the productivity draw
￿ uniquely identi￿es an intermediate good producer z, we now switch to the use of this draw ￿ as
our index for the intermediate good. Without loss of generality we assume that the industries are
ranked in order of increasing volatility so that ￿(i) is increasing in i.
Within each industry, there are ￿ ￿ exible￿and ￿ rigid￿sectors s, denoted respectively by ￿ and ￿.
We assume that a measure ￿c 2 [0;1] of sectors in industry i are ￿ exible (s 2 ￿), whereas a measure
(1 ￿ ￿c) are rigid (s 2 ￿). Labor is ex-ante perfectly mobile across sectors and industries. In a
￿ exible sector, ￿rms hire labor after uncertainty is realized. After the realization of ￿, production
and commodity market clearing take place in a competitive setting. Rigid sectors must hire labor
before uncertainty is realized, and the intermediate good producer is contractually committed to
paying the hired number of workers the agreed wage (regardless of the realization of ￿). We assume
labor market clearing: the wage w is such that there is full employment.2 After the realization
of ￿, production and commodity market clearing take place in a competitive setting, subject to
the wage and employment restrictions. Rigid-sector intermediate goods producers anticipate this
equilibrium, and adjust their contracted labor demand accordingly. Given ex-ante free entry into
the intermediate goods sector, expected pro￿ts of the rigid-sector intermediate good producers are
driven to zero.
2The presence of ￿rm-speci￿c productivity shocks does not a⁄ect aggregate outcomes. The law of large numbers
ensures there is no aggregate uncertainty in the model.
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The Flexible Sector
The appendix shows that for s 2 ￿, the sector-level price is given by
p￿ (i;s) =
w
~ ￿￿(i;s)
;
where the ￿ exible-sector average productivity level ~ ￿￿(i;s) is in-turn given by
~ ￿￿(i;s) =
￿Z 1
￿1
e("￿1)￿dGi (￿)
￿ 1
"￿1
:
The Rigid Sector
The appendix shows that for s 2 ￿, the sector-level price is given by
p￿ (i;s) =
w
~ ￿￿(i;s)
;
where the rigid-sector average productivity ~ ￿￿(i;s) is in-turn given by
~ ￿￿(i;s) =
￿Z 1
￿1
e
("￿1)
" ￿dGi (￿)
￿ "
"￿1
:
In general, ￿ exible sectors are more productive than rigid sectors (~ ￿￿(i;s) ￿ ~ ￿￿(i;s)), due to their
ability to reallocate labor from low-to high-productivity ￿rms. Notice that ~ ￿￿(i;s) = ~ ￿￿(i;s) only
if volatility is zero (￿2 (i) = 0): in this case, obviously, the ability of the ￿ exible sector to reallocate
labor is irrelevant.
Aggregation
In order to simplify the analysis, we parametrize the productivity draws to the normal distribution,
thus assuming that ￿ ￿ N
￿
0;￿2 (i)
￿
in industry i (the distribution Gi is Normal with mean 0 and
3The analysis of the ￿ exible and rigid sectors follows Cuæat and Melitz (2007). For completeness, we revisit some
analytics in the appendix.
4variance ￿2(i)). This yields average sector productivity
~ ￿￿(i;s) = exp
￿
(" ￿ 1)
￿2 (i)
2
￿
;
~ ￿￿(i;s) = exp
￿
(" ￿ 1)
"
￿2 (i)
2
￿
:
With ￿ exible and rigid sectors within each industry, autarky ￿nal-good prices in country c are given
by
pc (i) = expf￿c lnp￿ + (1 ￿ ￿c)lnp￿g =
wc
~ ￿(￿c;i)
;
where industry i productivity in country c, now depends on that country￿ s labor market ￿ exibility
￿c:
~ ￿(￿c;i) = exp
("
(" ￿ 1)
2
"
￿c +
(" ￿ 1)
"
#
￿2 (i)
2
)
:
Not surprisingly, the industry￿ s productivity varies positively with the degree of ￿ exibility ￿c.
4 Comparative Advantage
The discussion above shows how our model can be analyzed in reduced form as a standard Ricardian
model where country c technology for producing good i is given by the productivity term ~ ￿(￿c;i)
(the inverse unit input requirement). This function uniquely summarizes the Ricardian technology
di⁄erences across sectors and countries. In what follows, we take this function as a primitive for the
reduced form version of the model. This reduced form is a ￿modi￿ed￿version of the R-Economy
developed in Costinot (2009), where assumption 0 is not imposed, and thus accommodates the
case where countries specialize in a continuum of goods. Our main result regarding the pattern of
specialization in the open follows directly from the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Consider a multi-country Ricardian world with a single production factor and con-
stant returns to scale such that the output per unit input in sector i; ~ ￿(￿c;i), is log-supermodular
in both arguments. Then the open economy equilibrium with free trade must feature positive assor-
tative matching between countries (ranked by ￿c) and the range of sectors [ic;min;ic;max] in which
they specialize such that ￿c > ￿c0 =) ic;min ￿ ic0;max.
Note that this open economy equilibrium features complete specialization, such that countries
with di⁄erent country charasteristics produce at most a single good in common. The proof of the
proposition follows immediately from
5Lemma 1 Let i be a good that is produced by c, where ￿c > ￿c0; then c0 cannot produce any i0 > i.
Proof. Assume that c produces i and does not produce i0, and that c0 produces i0. Then it
must be the case that wc0=~ ￿(￿c0;i0) < wc=~ ￿(￿c;i0). Then, by log-supermodularity, c0 must produce
i cheaper than c:
~ ￿(￿c;i0)
~ ￿(￿c;i)
>
~ ￿(￿c0;i0)
~ ￿(￿c0;i)
:
This contradicts our original statement.
In the context of our model, the productivity function ~ ￿(￿c;i) is log-supermodular since it is
strictly positive and twice continuously di⁄erentiable with @2 ln ~ ￿(￿c;i)=(@￿c@i) > 0. Thus, under
free trade, countries with more ￿ exible labor markets specialize in segments of ￿nal goods subject
to a higher volatility. The average volatility of the production structure of a country with a ￿ exible
labor market must therefore be higher than that of a country with a rigid labor market.4
5 Concluding Remarks
We have shown how the insights developed in Cuæat and Melitz (2007) within a two-country model
can be extended to a many-country setting, thus providing a closer parallel with the empirical work
that is developed therein. The assumptions needed to generalize the results from a two-country
Ricardian model to many countries are not speci￿c to our particular institutional framework, and
can thus be applied more generally to multi-country Ricardian frameworks that satisfy the key
log-supermodularity condition for country-sector technology di⁄erences.
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7Appendix
A The Flexible Sector
Let p￿;￿(i;s;z) be the price of the intermediate good z in sector s 2 ￿ receiving a productivity
draw ￿. That good is priced at marginal cost e￿￿w. The sector-level price is then given by the
C.E.S. aggregator of the intermediate good prices:
p￿ (i;s) =
￿Z 1
￿1
p￿;￿ (i;s;z)
1￿" dGi (￿)
￿ 1
1￿"
;
=
w
hR 1
￿1 e("￿1)￿dGi (￿)
i 1
"￿1
;
where ~ ￿￿(i;s) ￿
hR 1
￿1 e("￿1)￿dGi (￿)
i 1
"￿1 represents the productivity level in a ￿ exible sector s 2 ￿.
B The Rigid Sector
The law of large numbers ensures that there is no aggregate uncertainty within each sector. We
assume that agents hold a diversi￿ed portfolio across ￿rms and hence that ￿rms maximize expected
pro￿ts. Given that all intermediate-good producers in a sector are ex-ante identical, there will be no
variation in the employment levels L￿ (i;s;z) across producers. Of course, their prices p￿;￿ (i;s;z)
and output levels y￿;￿ (i;s;z) will vary with their ex-post productivity draw ￿.
The ex-ante zero-pro￿t condition for an intermediate good producers equates its known labor
cost with expected revenue, hence
wL￿ (i;s;z) =
Z 1
￿1
p￿;￿ (i;s;z)y￿;￿ (i;s;z)dGi (￿): (B.1)
Market clearing for each intermediate good equates ex-post supply and demand:
e￿L￿ (i;s;z) =
￿
p￿;￿ (i;s;z)
p￿ (i;s)
￿￿"
y￿ (i;s); (B.2)
where the sector level price p￿ (i;s) is given by the C.E.S. aggregator of the intermediate good
prices:
p￿ (i;s) =
￿Z 1
￿1
p￿;￿ (i;s;z)
1￿" dGi (￿)
￿ 1
1￿"
: (B.3)
A-1Jointly, these equations (B.1), (B.2), and (B.3) determine the sector-level price
p￿ (i;s) =
w
hR 1
￿1 e
("￿1)
" ￿dGi (￿)
i "
"￿1
;
where ~ ￿￿(i;s) ￿
hR 1
￿1 e
("￿1)
" ￿dGi (￿)
i "
"￿1 represents the productivity level in a rigid sector s 2 ￿.
A-2